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History, geography and world-systems theory 
Gerry Kearns 
Peter Taylor's Political geography: world-economy, nation-state and locality 
presents the work of Immanuel Wallerstein to geographers in a clear and 
accurate fashion, flJ It reconnects political geography and political science, 
mapping Mackinder onto Spykman and Whittlesey onto Deutsch. It urges that 
human geography be a historical social science. Elsewhere, Taylor has teasingly 
averred "that all geography is historical geography", and has argued that the 
world-systems project speaks to the best of "traditional (that is pre-social- 
science) geography" which "left a holistic legacy to geography that was at 
variance with the growing specialisation i  the natural and social sciences". [21 He 
claims that in its preoccupation with the state "much of modern geography ha[s] 
in fact abandoned its global heritage" and that he has, therefore, turned from 
Marxist geography "to embrace an equally rich but alternative geography to be 
found in Wallerstein's Historical capitalism. The most fruitful geographical 
analyses have never been the prerogative of geographers, ensu strictu". [3J In 
complementary fashion, Wallerstein's cheme "locates geography at centre- 
stage instead of being a spatial appendix to social science". [4[ In this essay I want 
to look at two of the ways in which we might be persuaded to adopt the world- 
systems project: methodological nd historical argument. Taylor is faithful to 
the intentions of Wallerstein's work and I shall claim that there are problems 
with the project which are central to Wallerstein's major historical studies. The 
essay concludes with a sketch of the problematic relations between theory and 
practice in the project. The essay has little to offer on the philosophy of science 
and modern political studies of Wallerstein or Taylor. I also say nothing about 
Wallerstein's co-workers or about the many other big-picture histories from 
outside the Wallerstein camp. This is not because I do not recognise these issues 
as important. On the philosophical questions there already exist two interesting 
papers. E51 The other ignored issues would require extended treatment in their 
own right. Here I shall argue that the methodological principles Taylor takes 
from Wallerstein are far from being unique to the world-systems project and 
that, indeed, they are followed only fitfully by Wallerstein himself. On historical 
grounds, I have reservations about the way Wallerstein treats those mechanisms 
which he claims are constitutive of a modern world-system. Throughout I shall 
try to pay close attention to the purpose of Wallerstein's work, a historically and 
theoretically informed approach to the advance of socialist politics. 
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Wallerstein's methodology and the modern world-system as an entity 
From Wallerstein, Taylor takes three methodological principles, a 
commitment to the modern world-system as an object of study and a threefold 
characterisation f that entity. In this section I consider the approach to and 
definition of the modern world-system. In the next, I take up the historical 
arguments. 
Wallerstein's methodological claims are as follows, Firstly, taking up the 
substantivist critique of economic theory, Wallerstein follows Polanyi in 
attacking the "myth of universal laws". Market rationality, far from being a 
basic human attribute, flourishes under a quite specific set of institutional 
arrangements. Secondly, from Braudel, Wallerstein absorbs an interdisciplinary 
rhetoric astigating the "poverty of disciplines". Thirdly, from Frank, comes an 
abhorrence of the "error of developmentalism". The separate nation-states of
the world-economy are not autonomous entities passing through a sequence of 
stages which together constitute a development process, fundamentally the same 
from place to place, like the symptoms of a progressive or debilitating illness. 
The first point I want to make about these three methodological 
principles--the myth of universal laws, the poverty of disciplines and the error 
of developmentalism--is that geographers will find them in many other places 
than in Wallerstein and sometimes more forcefully and elaborately argued. The 
historical relativity of market rationality is comprehensively treated from a 
political and cultural point of view in the work of Max Weber and in an 
empirical manner in the work of many early-twentieth century 
economic-historical sociologists: Unwin, Sombart, Gras for example. The social 
history of markets is interestingly treated by the property-rights heorists and 
the new institutional economics. I do not share the optimism of Coase, Posner or 
North that institutions are optimally selected by market forces but I would agree 
that they are subject o economic pressures making the interplay of behaviour 
and context more complex than allowed for by either universal aws or 
substantivist anthropology. The argument for an interdisciplinary approach is 
advanced in almost every discipline and histoire totale is not obviously more 
attractive than cultural ecology, pragmatic literary criticism or historical 
materialism. Indeed a more adequate approach would surely reconsider the 
institutional basis of disciplines and review the intellectual dynamics of this 
poverty of disciplines. In a work of similar scope but different focus, Eric Wolf 
does just this and Europe and the people without history makes a case for a 
Polanyi-type of Marxism out of the varieties of social responsibility which 
disciplinary fragmentation was implicitly evolved to deny. I61 If identifying the 
error of developmentalism is primarily a plea for a more contextual approach, 
then it has long been the very stuff of historians' and geographers' quibbles with 
economists and sociologists. Of course these debates, in the simplistic form of 
idiographic versus nomothetic approaches, have also run through as well as 
from history and geography. If we shift the basis of the critique of 
developmentalism a little, to cover essentialist models of the economy, then 
geographers have the very fruitful Hindess and Hirst tradition to draw on. 
The second point I want to make about these principles is that Wallerstein 
does not actually stick to them. He does not pay much attention to the history of 
market institutions, to the evolution of rationality or, despite commenting on 
the immorality of profit-seeking in medieval Europe, to the psychosocial 
dynamics of the work ethic, which he refers to as "the incorporation within our 
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very superegos of the compulsion to work". [7] As for the poverty of disciplines, 
Wallerstein is forced, like all scholars, to betray his universalist rhetoric, ignore 
many sides of histoire totale ("the impossible dream") and write, particularly in 
Modern world-system II, basically a diplomatic history with a certain measure of 
background economic information. ~ Yet it is his developmentalism which is 
perhaps most shocking. This certainly carries most polemical weight in his 
writings. Some of this may be just shorthand for empirically-based 
generalisations as when he speaks of world wars restructuring the 
world-economy in the early-seventeenth, turn-of-the-nineteenth and 
mid-twentieth centuries: "It is to be noted", writes Wallerstein, "in each case, 
the victor had been primarily a maritime power prior to 'world war', but had 
transformed itself into a land power in order to win this war against a 
historically strong land power which seemed to be trying to transform the 
world-economy into a world-empire. ''r91 However, more serious still is 
Wallerstein's developmental sequence for the "core-state-cycle", as we might 
call it. The rise and fall of states, argues Wallerstein, is powered by their 
productivity which is a function of technology and wages. A low-wage state with 
weak labour introduces a technology improving its productivity. It rises to 
productive hegemony among core states, in its train this brings commercial 
hegemony as the state comes to dominate trade, on the back of its exports, 
leading to financial hegemony as its leadership secures it sound-money status 
and its growth makes it a safe place for credit. All the time, its prosperity makes 
the bourgeoisie tempted to buy off working-class pressure with higher wages 
funded out of exports and thus essentially out of unequal exchange with the rest 
of the world. Social imperialism fuels inflation at the very time that other 
countries, now with relatively low wages, copy the new technologies, and thus 
productive hegemony is surrendered. For a while the specialist skills of 
merchants maintain trade hegemony before even that goes and the financial 
hegemony lingers on as the country serves as an efficient clearing house passing 
domestic and foreign investments o the new productive leader in the core. In 
turn this new leader attracts to itself trading and financial functions and in 
decline the old leader everts to low wage status awaiting any new developments. 
Wallerstein concludes: "These superiorities are successive, but they overlap in 
time. Similarly, the loss of advantage seems to be in the same order (from 
productive to commercial to financial), and also largely successive ''[1~ and he 
sets the model out explicitly for seventeenth-century Dutch hegemony. [111 
Inflation and war go hand in hand as the economic and political dimensions of 
the geographical restructuring of the world economy during periods of 
stagnation, although the two dimensions may have different chronologiesJ 12J
Not only is Wallerstein keen to embrace a cyclic, although not linear, 
developmentalism which applies to states, not systems or entities, he is also keen 
to give his whole history the most explicit eleological basis. The intention of the 
system was to polarise benefits patially_in a way which belies the progressive 
balance sheet which could be drawn up for the current leaders of the core. In an 
astonishing passage he writes "If  this is so, why did such a system arise? Perhaps, 
precisely to achieve this end. What could be more plausible than a line of 
reasoning which argues that the explanation of the origin of a system was to 
achieve an end that has in fact been achieved? I know that modern science has 
turned us from the search for final causes and from all considerations of 
intentionality (especially since they are so inherently difficult to demonstrate 
empirically). But modern science and historical capitalism have been in close 
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alliance as we know; thus, we must suspect the authority of science on precisely 
this question: the modality of knowing the origins of modern capitalism. ''t131 
Out of these methodological principles, and from an observation of the 
constraints on autonomous political and economic development in 
contemporary African states, Wallerstein fashions his commitment to the study 
of the modern world-system as the appropriate object of study, a self-sufficient 
entity, unlike states, and a historical, multi-state totality. 
It would be intriguing to draw out Wallerstein's epistemological 
commitments, they include rational a priori knowledge (his reasoning from the 
mystical value of the number three) and a form of categorical essentialism akin 
to the reification of system in general systems theory; perhaps he has not moved 
far enough from American political science. But epistemology is a virus, and 
Peter Taylor has caught it badly with his political economy of scale. If we need 
an epistemology atall it would presumably connect he following: real events, a
method of studying them and a set of concepts which describes them. Taylor, 
following Wallerstein, conflates all three. Speaking of the mere possibility of 
writing local studies he warns that "Since the world-economy is a holistic 
concept, however, it follows that one scale of analysis cannot be hived off and 
studied separately any more than economic or political processes can be treated 
in isolation. ''tl41 This might be viewed as merely an extravagant plea for context 
but, no, we are told that only the world-system/world-scale is r al because it is 
the whole: "By 'reality' we are referring to the holistic reality that is the concrete 
world-economy which incorporates the other scales. It is in this sense the totality 
of the system. Hence ultimate xplanations within the system must be referred 
back to this 'whole'. It is the scale that 'really matters'. ' t~51 Holistic relates to 
concepts, scale relates to measurement or method and whole relates to reality yet 
here these distinctions are completely collapsed. Out of this mishmash, relations 
and identifies defined at one level are asserted at another. And this is precisely 
what Wallerstein does too. The polemical force of insisting on writing about 
historical capitalism derives from equating historical with actual or real as 
opposed either to the logico-deductive (purely conceptual) model of Capital 
volume one or the anachronistic "mythologised foil ''t~61 used in, perhaps, 
Mandel to point up the specifics of actual, modern, late capitalism. No, says 
Wallerstein, capitalism as actuality is historical, is a system, a world-economy 
fundamentally unchanging since its establishment as such, in the sixteenth 
century, a watershed he compares to the invention of agriculture during the 
Neolithic. t~71 The whole defines the parts, 1~81 so that, for example, Wallerstein 
asks "Is it conceptually useful to apply the label 'proletarian' to an individual? I 
doubt it. ''t~91 Because individuals are parts of households where much of the 
labour that is allocated, demeaningly termed "domestic", is not done in return 
for wages. These distinctions are maintained at the level of the "legal and 
para-legal apparatus of gender distinction and discrimination", t2~ One might 
have expected some sort of heuristic defence of the political economy of scale, 
some demonstration of its conceptual value in theorising certain sets of social 
relations. But, no, what we actually get from Taylor is a sort of epistemological 
fiat. The global just is real. Suggesting that the world-scale alone is real, that the 
local-scale is merely experience he sees the state separating local political 
experience from global economic reality. Hence we get what Taylor terms his 
"political economy of scale". The economic reality is a zero-sum game but the 
state ideologically presents it as a choice and in another classic conflation of 
category and reality he writes "The role of all three-tier structures is the 
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promotion of a middle category to separate conflicting interests. In our model, 
therefore, the national stage becomes the mediator between global and local 
scales. ''E2q This addition of a mystical belief in the properties of the number 
"three' also receives its imprimatur from WallersteinJ 221 At the close of the first 
volume, Wallerstein reminds us that the whole defines its parts so that "the 
emergence, consolidation, and political roles of classes and status groups must 
be appreciated as elements of this world-system". And then he goes on to set out 
the following staggering description of class struggle: "since in conflict 
situations, multiple fractions tend to reduce to two by virtue of the forging of 
alliances [note that he assumes they are stable], it is by definition [again 
collapsing category and reality] not possible to have three or more (conscious) 
classes"J 231 The class consciousness of the ruling class, though, will sharpen that 
of the oppressed. Spatially, the same is true and to counter the polarisation of 
core and periphery the semi-periphery makes exploitation less direct and the 
perception of fundamental relations less likely, an alliance of core and 
semi-periphery or of semi-periphery and periphery is ruled out by the 
contradictory pulls on the semi-periphery: a mystifying trinity. 
The modern world-system as a reality 
Does it all matter? Moving from methodology to history, how adequate are 
the empirical studies? Let us examine the structure of Wallerstein's 
world-systems model in terms of the three criteria he himself defines it by. These 
three criteria are: a single world market, a multiple states ystem and a three-tier 
economic geography. This gives us the modern world-system which since the 
sixteenth century in essence "had not changed at all (such that we could denote 
the entire reality under one name)", r241 A short-hand summary of my remarks on 
these three features might be: no win, no change, no evidence. 
Under a single world market, the economic autonomy of each part of the 
system is destroyed, decisions about the allocation of resources take place in a 
framework where the fundamental signals derive from the situation of the place 
within the chains of commodity production, distribution and exchange which 
make up the world-economy. I251 This is an important claim because it 
underwrites Wallerstein's politics of despair, his zero-sum interpretation of 
national politics. This has been the situation, Wallerstein insists, since the 
sixteenth century. Yet Wallerstein, in common with most economic historians, 
has great difficulty documenting the behavioural context of economic 
decision-making in the past. Rather, he confines himself to inferring the 
economic ontext of national political decisions. He claims, again and again, to 
uncover the economic group interests behind international diplomacy and, just 
as frequently, locates those economic group interests in the group/state's 
world-economy situation. However, this assumes that most production is 
market oriented, that most markets are integrated into national and 
international trading systems, that these markets reflect costs of production at 
different locations, that the markets balance and that inefficiency is an 
unacceptable and impossibly high price to pay for autarky. Wallerstein may 
bring space back into social science but he certainly does not carry any brief for 
distance. Yet to speak of market integration i sixteenth-century Europe is to fly 
in the face of overwhelming evidence that most producers were food producers, 
that the bulk of production was consumed on the farm and only a residual surplus 
was marketed and that the cost of inland-transport was so high that the 
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possibility of much food entering international markets was slight. Even in terms 
of national markets, inter-regional specialisation was only deepening over the 
seventeenth century and England is considered advanced in eliminating a largely 
self-sufficient peasantry by the sixteenth century. With this proviso Dodgshon is 
willing to accept Wallerstein's analysis from the nineteenth century, implicitly 
consigning both published volumes to marginalia and, no doubt, eagerly 
awaiting the next. E261 Distance to market means that prices reflect more than just 
costs of production. Yet doubts about Wallerstein's explanation of economic 
change and political context are increased by the fact that he nowhere pursues 
the question of how important international trade was to domestic production. 
This is not an easy topic but I am persuaded by O'Brien and others that Britain's 
rise to productive hegemony in the eighteenth century did not involve either a 
large proportion of British raw material needs being met by imports or that a 
large volume of its production featured as exports, r271 Unequal exchange makes 
this evaluation difficult and providing a model of a shadow economy with 
domestic lumber or cotton harvested at English rural wage-rates or with reduced 
demand is almost impossible. Nevertheless, in sheer volume terms, the isolation 
of much production from international markets means that the multiplier effects 
of international trade would have to be outstanding for this to explain Britain's 
prosperity. Rather than a world system it is the local and intense xploitation of 
Ireland which stands most chance of supporting Wallerstein's model. Finally, 
what exactly does the single world market balance? Unequal exchange means it 
balances both force and productivity; as well as transport costs of course. This 
multiple determinacy means that arguing cause and effect is difficult. Certainly 
the competitive advantage of low defence spending to Japan and Germany is 
clear since 1945, whereas the brutality of the USA in keeping the markets of 
poor countries open to unequal exchange has been spectacular. Always 
assuming markets do balance, and there are three reasons why they don't. 
Firstly, exchanges do not reflect scarcity as much as the unequal distribution of 
desparation to exchange. Secondly, exchanges are not simultaneous although 
the velocity of circulation has been increasing (with bi-annual fairs for many 
commodities in much of sixteenth-century Europe, what must it have been like 
then?). Thirdly, there is no regulatory body which can bring deficits and 
surpluses together faced with the intransigence of powerful economies. Only 
where there is only one strong economy is the world economy stable in the face 
of this blatant exploitation. Taken together, these observations on a single world 
market highlight Wallerstein's unbounded faith in the efficiency and 
pervasiveness of international markets. Against this I would argue that the way 
national economies are put together directly affects productivity, this is not a 
zero-sum game. The distribution of benefits and resources in society directly feeds 
through to productivity. Wallerstein is too pessimistic and the management of
national economies does matter, as Therborn has shown for unemployment in 
Europe.[ 28! 
Turning to the multiple states system, we find Wallerstein's faith in the 
efficiency of markets upported by a disturbing faith in the prescience of the 
bourgeoisie. Were the multiple states system to be replaced by a single world 
empire the political control of markets would mean that what Dodgshon terms 
less well-adapted zones of unused freedom I291 would be filled up with complete 
adaptation to prevailing patterns of production. Wallerstein writes that "The 
states developed and were shaped as integral parts of an interstate system, which 
was a set of rules within which the state had to operate and a set of 
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legitimisations without which states could not survive. From the point of view of 
the state-machineries of any given state, the interstate system represented 
constraints on its will."[3~ Military elites often try to establish world empires and 
Wallerstein concludes that "I f  such thrusts never succeeded in historical 
capitalism, it was because the structural base of the economic system and the 
clearly-perceived interests of the major accumulators of capital were 
fundamentally opposed to a transformation of the world-economy into a 
world-empire. ''t3q How the collective committee of national bourgeoisies 
articulate this perceived interest we are not told. This functionalism also relates 
to the formation of the bourgeoise: through states in the core and nations in the 
periphery. In the core there "was a reasonably high level of continuity between 
the families that had been high strata in 1450 and those that were high strata in 
1650. Furthermore, if one substituted 1900 for 1650, one would find that most of 
the comparisons with 1450 still hold true", ml Between 1450 and 1650 the 
tendency towards egalitarian small peasant systems of production was halted by 
the bourgeoisie fighting within itself to direct the state in restructuring the 
economy; liberty and democracy were ideological weapons in "intra-bourgois 
struggles", t331 State formation represents the transformation of a landed 
aristocracy into a national bourgeoisie: "historical capitalism was brought into 
existence by a landed aristocracy which transformed itself into a bourgeoisie 
because the old system was disintegrating"J 341The transition to capitalism, 
therefore, did not involve a bourgeois revolution: " I f  there was no bourgeois 
revolution, does that mean there has been or will be no proletarian revolution? 
Not at all, logically or empirically. But it does mean we have to approach the 
subject of transitions differently. 'q351 Wallerstein sees the ruling class families of 
1900 evaporating but they might yet pull the iron from the fire by making society 
egalitarian and their hegemony more stable. Yet the real challenge comes from 
anti-systemic forces in the semi-periphery. Here states are created as cultural 
entities, the political expression of ethnic communities. The nationalistic 
bourgeoisie n such countries are co-opted cadres leading their cheap labour into 
an unequal world market but one which promises them as leaders the 
consolation of rationalism and the chimerical promise of the American dream. 
The important thing, though, is that the ideology of decolonisation, ationalism 
and socialism are all part of the evolution of historical capitalism, the latest 
veneer on the search of core capital for peripheral cheap labour. The communist 
countries, we are told, are functional for capitalist accumulation i  precisely this 
way. For Wallerstein, the no-win situation imposed by efficient markets is 
reinforced by the no-change scenario spelled out by an all-seeing, all-adjusting 
world bourgeoisie. 
Of course, what all of this denies is qualitative changes in the relations of 
production and the centrality of the class struggle to which the bourgeoisie must 
respond. Instead, access to resources i determined by prices not power and the 
strength of the bourgeoisie is indicated by economic productivity rather than 
working class pressure. Out of all this, Brenner convicts Wallerstein of retreating 
from Marx to Smith. [36] But Wallerstein might claim to have an answer. 
Remember, his world system has three regions: core, semi-periphery and 
periphery and these contain differing mixtures of two sets of processes: 
exploiting and exploited, high wage and low wage, high technology and low 
technology. These higher wages reflect bourgeois concessions to working-class 
pressure, are funded out of exploitation of the periphery and express themselves 
as a relaxation of the intensity of exploitation of labour, an increase in the extent 
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to which the costs of the reproduction of labour power are passed outside the 
home, and a recognition that labour in the core is generally high status. It is in 
this sense that labour in the core is considered scarce and jobs are highly 
capitalised. This is a tendency towards proletarianisation for free labour. The 
share-cropping and slavery labour systems of semi-periphery and periphery 
respectively in sixteenth-century agriculture reflect weaker proletarianisation 
and successively higher degrees of labour coercion. [37] Thus European expansion 
overseas was primarily a search for a cheaper and "more tractable labour 
force". [3s] Yet Wallerstein wants it both ways because there were also settler 
colonies to which labour was sent. Underemployed at home, they did not 
generate sufficient demand for manufactured goods; fully employed abroad they 
could generate the demand against which colonial staples might exchange, 
thereby reducing the export of bullion from Britain. However, 
underemployment at home in the seventeenth century when the major concern 
of England and France was to find employment for their workers does not square 
well with labour scarcity arguments and high wages. Much of the cheap coerced 
labour of the periphery before the nineteenth century was not employed 
producing the goods which were already being made in the core with extensive 
labour. It was a switch to new lines of production (such as silver mining, sugar 
production) or an expansion in the sheer volume of production (as in lumber or 
corn) rather than a shift within an existing product mix between high- and 
low-cost labour inputs. Despite the obvious attraction of not doing so, 
Wallerstein refuses to recognise a continuum in the degree of coercion of the 
labour force from core to periphery. Although he tries to set out a qualitative 
difference between wage labour, share-cropping and slavery it would appear that 
these precise forms are contingent and largely confined to the period of agrarian 
world capitalism. [391 While industrial abour can be coercive it takes rather 
different forms. Thus the position of the semi-periphery is defined as 
intermediary in commodity chains, exploiting the periphery and being exploited 
by the core. Yet Wallerstein must concede that this is a matter of degree and to 
understand why the separate xistence of a semi-periphery is so important o 
him we need to look at the role he expects it to perform: "these middle areas. . .  
partially deflect the political pressures which groups primarily located in 
peripheral areas might otherwise direct against core states and the groups which 
operate within and through their state machineries". [4~ In addition to this 
political functionality, the contrasting systems of labour help the differentiation 
of separate lines of production or links in the commodity chain, "each mode of 
labour control is best suited for particular types of production" and without 
three separate zones "it would not have been possible to assure the kind of flow 
of the surplus which enabled the capitalist system to come into existence". [4q In 
the two volumes of empirical history Wallerstein has given us there is little of any 
substance to support hese claims. The periphery of the world economy in the 
eighteenth century was being directly coerced by the core and it was the British 
in India and in the Caribbean rather than, say, the Poles, who received the sharp 
resistance these colonies offered. Wallerstein confuses a hierarchy of wage costs 
with a physical flow of products along a commodity chain (not common at the 
time, the international division of labour within stages of production being 
weak) with a political chain of command. He does not substantiate he claim 
that the semi-periphery absorbs political tension. It is however on this topic o f  
the form of labour control that Wallerstein's political conclusions are most wild. 
The hierarchy of labour is sustained by two things, a recognition of the different 
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status of labour at different places (racism) and the commodification of 
everything in the core including the costs of reproducing labour power borne 
elsewhere in the world by the sexist dismissal of such work as domestic and 
unproductive. Wage labour, then, is non-racist and non-sexist. In this sense it is 
socialist. I was frankly staggered to read Wallerstein's paeon to "free" labour: 
"Free labour is indeed a defining feature of capitalism, but not free labour 
throughout the productive nterprises. Free labour is the form of labour control 
used for skilled work in core countries whereas coerced labour is used for less 
skilled work in peripheral areas. The combination thereof is the essence of 
capitalism. When labour is everywhere free, we shall have socialism". [421 I am 
reminded of Marx: "The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within 
whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a 
very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, 
Equality, Property and Bentham . . . .  When we leave this sphere of simple 
circulation or the exchange of commodities, which provides the 'free-trader 
vulgaris' with his views, his concepts and the standard by which he judges the 
society of capital and wage-labour, a certain change takes place, or so it appears, 
in the physiognomy of our dramatis personae. He who was previously the 
money-owner now strides out in front as a capitalist; the possessor of 
labour-power follows as his worker. The one smirks self-importantly and is 
intent on business; the other is timid and holds back, like someone who has 
brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect but- -a 
hiding."[43] 
Epistemology, mythology and polities 
... Pellerin exclaimed: 
"I don't want any of your hideous reality! What do you mean by reality, anyway? Some see 
black, some see blue, and the mob see wrong. There's nothing less natural than Michelangelo 
and nothing more powerful. The cult of external truth reveals the vulgarity of our times; and if 
things go on this way, art is going to become a sort of bad joke inferior to religion in poetry and 
interior to politics in interest . . . .  " 
(Gustave Flaubert, Sentimental Education, 1869; Penguin edition, p. 58). 
Humanity's stupid rationalism contains an unimaginably large element of materialism. This 
fear of error which everything recalls to me at every moment of the flight of my ideas, this mania 
for control, makes man prefer eason's imagination tothe imagination ofthe senses. And yet it 
is always the imagination alone which is at work. Nothing, neither strict logic nor overwhelming 
impression, can convince me that I am not basing reality on a delirium of interpretation. 
(Louis Aragon, Paris Peasant, 1926; Picador edition, p. 23). 
The surrealism of Aragon makes impressionism an epistemology. At least 
Flaubert's Pellerin recognised something distinctive in art, projecting a "sort of 
Stock Exchange handling aesthetic interests" (p. 294) and asking of the 
revolutionary clubs of 1848 "I 'd like to know where the candidate for Art is to 
be found" (p. 305). On each occasion the reverie, "the delirium of 
interpretation", is interrupted by a "large element of materialism": " 'What 
nonsense' grumbled a voice in the crowd. 'Always a lot of fancy ideas! Nothing 
significant'" (p. 294); " 'We don't want any pictures!' retorted a thin man with 
red spots on his cheekbone" (p. 305). The mythology of the revolt of the 
democratic spirit clearly needed to be nurtured, as Pellerin had anticipated " . . .  I 
think the Chambers ought to legislate in the interests of Art. A chair of 
aesthetics ought to be founded, with a professor who combined theory with 
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practice, and who one day, I should hope, might succeed in educating the 
masses" (p. 144). 
The world-systems project ought to be more than a matter of educating taste 
yet we are offered few guidelines for its systematic evaluation. There is a 
recklessness about the response of Taylor and Wallerstein to their critics which 
raises the suspicion that such guidelines may be loose or evanescent. When 
Taylor writes that "all assertions of truth are based on assumptions which 
ultimately involve a metaphysics of values", [441 the "ultimate" is almost 
immediate. Confession replaces analysis and a pluralistic balancing of 
commitments replaces morality. We choose our myths, Taylor tells us, so that 
"the clash between Wallerstein and his critics is one of 'opposing faiths'."[45] It is 
hard to imagine that it is their misplaced faith in history-as-progress which leads 
Marxists to characterise pre-industrial Europe as a system of mercantile 
capitalism rather than, as Wallerstein would have it, a system of agricultural 
capitalism. Wallerstein may be empirically correct here but Faith does not seem 
to require mpirical commitments of this type. In addition to this "if it feels good 
. . . "  epistemology, Taylor also recognises an alternative path to truth, a 
heuristic "suck it and see" approach. Of Wallerstein's categorisation of modes 
of production, based on Polanyi, Taylor tells us that "the test . . ,  is in the fresh 
insights it provides" .[46] While slightly different from honesty and at least making 
some reference beyond the investigator's own imagination, "insight" is still a 
little vague, and would hardly stand up to the professedly "realist" critique with 
which Taylor bears down on positivist social science. E471 In fact, Taylor wishes to 
place these insights at the service of the anti-systemic forces, working, 
apparently, for a kind of socialist United Nations, and to offer the 
world-systems project hostage to the success of this movement: "[the] whole 
scheme is ultimately tested through political practice". I481 On this occasion the 
"ultimate" is unfortunately delayed until such time as Wallerstein's mythology 
is embraced by the anti-systemic forces. Their "ultimate" success will be the 
proof that the history informing the myth is useful. Corbridge has documented 
the way Radical Development Geography shields itself from empirical 
embarrassment by epistemological fiat: Marxism is science and we listen to no 
other. [491 Taylor shares their conception of commitment as confession, he just 
has a different faith. Yet faith should come from "lessons", which is surely why 
Wallerstein embarked on his empirical studies in the first place. There is more at 
work in politics than "the imagination alone" and mythologies do not simply 
work or not: they embody more or less honest, decent and truthful historical 
accounts. It may disappoint literary critics, but when Aragon took political 
action seriously he embraced the very realism he had earlier ejected as an artist. 
Indeed Aragon took on the mythology of the Republican France attempting to 
wrest La Marseillaise from its jingoistic mission of irrigating French fields with 
bad foreign blood to align it with a communist party politics when they might 
prove what was the redder, the blood of the bourgeois or the blood of the 
worker, tS~ Mythologies are contestable, historical social science is only one way 
of doing so and in this function it is to be judged as correct before useful. 
Mythologies may also be challenged artistically but let us recognise a division of 
labour here and not confuse the laws of development appropriate to these two 
spheres: 
Je salue ici 
L'Internationale contre La Marseillaise 
C~de le pas, 6 Marseillaise 
DEBATE 291 
A L'Internationale car voici 
L'automne de tes jours, voici 
L'Octobre o6 tombent es derniers accents ...  
(Louis Aragon, ROponse auxjacobins, 1934) 
University o f  Liverpool, 
P.O. Box  147, 
Liverpool L69 3BX 
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